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Introduction
Evidence on careers and wages within …rms suggests that, while pay does grow within job grades, higher wages tend to be attained mainly through job changes. Consequently, incentives in most organizations seem to derive primarily from the prospect of future promotions (Baker, Jensen, and Murphy, 1988; Baker, Gibbs, and Holmström, 1994a,b) . Furthermore, a typical …rm tends to promote its workers for relative rather than absolute performance (DeVaro, 2006) . In sum, most workers appear to be engaged in a promotion tournament-a competition for a limited number of higher level jobs.
From the previous work by Lazear and Rosen (1981) , Nalebu¤ and Stiglitz (1983) , Malcomson (1984) , Rosen (1986) , and others, we have a good understanding of how …rms can use promotions and tournaments to motivate employees. 1 However, the prevalent approach in this literature has been to focus on a single …rm that (i) is assumed to be able to commit to arbitrary future wages and (ii) does not face ex post competition for its workers. These are restrictive assumptions. First, as stressed for example by Prendergast (1993), …rms may have an incentive to renege on their future wage promises, a consideration left out of the standard promotion models, in which the source of the …rm's commitment power is usually not speci…ed. Second, most real world …rms have to compete for their employees with other …rms, which means that the wages they can promise to tournament winners and losers are constrained by the outside labor markets. Speci…cally, because individuals are free to change employers any time they wish, no …rm can a¤ord to pay its employees less than what other …rms are willing to o¤er. Thus, the wage increase a worker receives upon promotion is determined at least as much by the outside labor market as by the …rm's desire to provide optimal incentives. 2 This view is consistent with the evidence provided by Baker, Gibbs, and Holmström (1994a) and by Lazear and Oyer (2004) . Baker et al note that the …rm they study does not employ tournaments as traditionally modeled: "The scheme is not tailored to individual preferences or traits; for instance, there is no adjustment of the contest for common prizes" (p. 953). Similarly, Lazear and Oyer examine detailed personnel records data from Sweden and conclude that "in the 1 For more recent contributions, see, for example, Fairburn and Malcomson (2001) , Moldovanu and Sela (2001) , and Hvide (2002). 2 One early paper that recognizes this point is Gibbs (1995) , who studies how incentives from promotions interact with explicit performance contracts.
1 long run, the wages paid by the typical …rm are determined by prevailing wages in the market, not by conditions in the …rm."
This paper studies promotion tournaments in which the …rms' abilities to design tournament prizes are constrained by outside labor markets and in which the …rms'commitment power comes from repeated interaction in the labor market. The starting point is the static framework developed in Zabojnik and Bernhardt (2001) , in which promotion tournaments motivate workers to accumulate human capital because a promotion serves as a signal that the worker has a high level of skills.
This framework combines the standard tournament model of Lazear and Rosen (1981) with the information view of promotions suggested by Waldman (1984) . Following Waldman, I assume that a current employer has private information about the skills of its employees, while the …rm's competitors can only infer a worker's skill from observing whether the worker was promoted or not. 3 In particular, the competing …rms use Bayesian updating to conclude that the expected productivity of the promoted worker is higher than the expected productivity of those not promoted.
Correspondingly, they bid the wage of a promoted worker above the wages of those not promoted and this determines the workers'spot market wages and hence the spot market tournaments. This approach is in line with the empirical evidence in Gibbons and Katz (1991) , Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) , DeVaro and Waldman (2005) , Kahn (2007) , and Pinkston (forthcoming) , who document that asymmetric information plays an important role in …rms'hiring, training, job assignment, and wage setting decisions. 4 In the static model of Zabojnik and Bernhardt (2001) , …rms have no control over their tournament prizes and the market determined tournaments are generically ine¢ cient. The static setting, however, is not entirely realistic. As argued by Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (2002) , …rms are riddled with relational contracts that govern numerous aspects of their internal labor markets, including promotions. The present paper explicitly examines how relational contracts -i.e., informal agreements supported by reputational concerns in a repeated game setting -allow …rms to overcome the constraints imposed on promotion tournaments by the outside labor markets. 5 3 Many other theoretical papers have highlighted asymmetric information as a key feature of labour markets, e.g., Lazear (1986) , Greenwald (1986) , Gibbons and Katz (1991) , Bernhardt (1995) , and Chang and Wang (1996) . 4 Schönberg (2007) is another recent paper that tests for asymmetric employer learning. She concludes that learning appears to be mostly symmetric, although in the case of college graduates the evidence is also consistent with asymmetric learning. 5 MacLeod and Malcomson (1988) also model promotions in a repeated game setting in which wages are constrained by an outside labor market. Their focus, however, is on explaining how a hierarchy can arise endogenously in an organization. Also, the workers in MacLeod and Malcomson (1988) are in…nitely lived, which makes them easier to 2 The model yields several insights about the e¢ ciency and the optimal design of promotion tournaments and about the workers'incentives to acquire human capital: 1) First, when relational contracts are feasible, …rms have an incentive to use them to commit to future wages that di¤er from the spot market wages. Furthermore, the wages supported by the relational contracts always weakly exceed the spot market wages. Nevertheless, the equilibrium wages under the relational tournaments could be lower than those under spot market tournaments.
This would be the case when spot wages provide incentives that lead to wastefully large investments in human capital, as in the winner-take-all professions described by Frank and Cook (1995) . In such winner-take-all industries, relational tournaments optimally mute incentives and therefore suppress average wages.
2) Contrary to the intuition one might have based on the Folk Theorems for repeated games, full e¢ ciency is never achieved in a market equilibrium if …rms are perfectly competitive, even if the discount factor is arbitrarily close to one. This also contrasts with the conclusions of the standard tournament models in which …rms can commit to arbitrary future wages, such as Lazear and Rosen (1981) , Green and Stokey (1983) , and Nalebu¤ and Stiglitz (1983) . In these standard models, promotion tournaments can be designed to provide fully e¢ cient incentives, as long as workers are risk neutral. Relational tournaments in competitive …rms do not restore full e¢ ciency because …rms must earn equilibrium pro…ts in order to be willing to maintain a reputation for paying above spot market wages. Consequently, unlike in static models, perfect competition in labor markets does not lead to maximization of social surplus.
3) More productive …rms (e.g., …rms with product market power, or monopolistic …rms for short) pay higher wages, because they …nd it easier to sustain reputation for paying wages that exceed the spot market level. Promotion tournaments in monopolistic …rms therefore provide more e¢ cient incentives to accumulate human capital than the tournaments in competitive …rms. 
Related literature
Apart from the work on promotions and tournaments discussed above and represented by Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Waldman (1984) , this paper is related to the literature on human capital investment, especially to the papers that highlight the role of promotions and of asymmetric information. In the former strand are the papers by Carmichael (1983) and Prendergast (1993), as well as Zabojnik and Bernhardt (2001) on which this model builds most directly. Similar to the present paper, both Carmichael (1983) and Prendergast (1993) investigate how …rms can use promotions to induce workers to accumulate human capital, but their focus is on …rm-speci…c rather than general human capital, and they assume that …rms can fully commit to wages attached to di¤erent jobs.
Among the papers that study how asymmetric information in labor markets a¤ects investments in human capital, the closest papers are probably Katz and Ziderman (1990) , Waldman (1990) , Chang and Wang (1996) , and Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) . They all share with the present paper the idea that a worker's current employer is better informed about the worker's skills than the outside labor market. Katz and Ziderman (1990) argue that this kind of asymmetric information makes a worker's general training less valuable to an outside …rm than to his current employer, who may therefore be willing to share with the worker the cost of the training. Waldman (1990) shows how under spot market contracts asymmetric learning about workers'skills can destroy the workers'incentives to accumulate general human capital and how these incentives can be restored through up-or-out contracts. Chang and Wang (1996) and Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) also derive the result that asymmetric information about a worker's skills leads to underinvestment in human capital and they investigate how the investment depends on worker turnover, on credit constraints (Acemoglu and Pischke) and on the speci…city of the training (Chang and Wang). Neither of these papers considers the role of promotions and of the …rm's ability to commit to future wages.
Finally, this paper also contributes to the small literature on the relationship between the degree of competition in a …rm's product market and the e¢ ciency of incentives within the …rm (e.g., Hart, 1983; Schmidt, 1997; and Raith, 2003) . First, while the existing literature typically concentrates on the incentives of the …rms' managers, the present paper yields insights about the interaction between a …rm's market power and the incentives of the employees below the CEO level. Second, although the theoretical models in this literature do not yield a clear-cut prediction, most authors appear to conclude that competition in the product market tends to improve incentives within 4 …rms. This paper identi…es a setting in which product market competition unambiguously worsens incentives within …rms. In fact, as already noted, perfectly competitive …rms never achieve full e¢ ciency in the present framework.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section introduces the basic tournament model and the key assumptions. Section 3 provides a preliminary analyses of promotion tournaments for the case of no commitment and for the case of full commitment, which will serve as benchmarks for the subsequent analysis. Section 4 embeds the tournaments in a relational contract setting and derives the main results for the case of markets with unconstrained wages. Section 5 examines the e¤ects of a wage ‡oor on tournament incentives in both competitive and monopolistic …rms. Section 6 concludes.
The Model
Consider an in…nitely lived economy with overlapping generations of risk-neutral workers. In every period, a measure one of young workers are born and a measure one of old workers retire. Each worker lives for two periods. The …rms that compete for the workers'services are in…nitely lived and risk-neutral, and they di¤er according to the production technology to which they have access, as detailed below. Time is discrete and all agents in the economy discount the future using a common discount factor < 1: As is common in repeated games, but unlike in standard one-period tournament models, this discount factor will play an important role in the subsequent analysis.
Investment in human capital
In contrast to the conventional models in which tournaments motivate workers to provide e¤ort, the focus here will be on the workers' incentives to accumulate costly human capital. The main reason is that promotions have two goals: to motivate workers and to assign workers to the jobs in which they are most productive. While in general these two goals could con ‡ict with each other (Baker, Jensen, and Murphy, 1988), they are more likely to be aligned in the case of human capital investments than in the case of e¤ort, because promoting the highest skilled worker …ts well with both goals. In line with this argument, the importance of promotions in motivating human capital accumulation was stressed by Carmichael (1983) 
Production technology
In every period, each …rm has n training positions for young workers, where n is exogenously given. 7 The …rms have an unlimited number of laborer positions in which they can employ old workers, but only one old worker can be employed as manager. 8 A …rm's revenue from a young worker is zero in the managerial position and V in a laborer position, where 0 is a constant and V is the …rm's productivity parameter, which can be high,
An old worker's productivity does not depend upon his job assignment; it only depends upon his tenure with the …rm and his human capital. Speci…cally, the output of an old worker who has developed human capitalh is V h if the worker remains with his …rst-period employer and Vh if the worker switches employers. The parameter > 1 re ‡ects the fact that part of the worker's 6 Ghosh and Waldman (2006) apply their model to explain why some …rms employ up-or-out contracts, while others use standard promotion practices. 7 In Zabojnik and Bernhardt (2001) , the number of young workers a …rm chooses to train is determined endogenously. Since in the present model …rm size plays no important role, making n endogenous would only introduce unnecessary complications. 8 Consequently, the model does not exhibit the promotion distortion whereby …rms promote too few workers, which is a focus of much of the literature that builds on Waldman (1984).
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human capital is …rm speci…c and is lost if the worker leaves his …rst-period employer.
Under the parameter restrictions of Assumption 1(a), …rm speci…c human capital is su¢ ciently important so that the prospective employers can never outbid a worker's …rst period employer.
This eliminates from the wage setting process the winner's curse that tends to plague this kind of models. It also implies that no turnover is observed in equilibrium. Assumption 1(b) guarantees that the realization of a worker's human capital is always non-negative. This condition could be easily made less restrictive at the cost of complicating the exposition, by adding a …xed component to each worker's accumulated human capital.
The di¤erence V H V L can be thought of as the degree of market power enjoyed by the V Htype …rms in their respective product markets. The number of the V H …rms is …xed and limited by a measure < 1=(2n 1), while the number of the V L …rms is endogenously determined by free entry conditions. This setup is meant to capture in a reduced form the fact that some …rms enjoy persistent competitive advantages, whether due to barriers to entry, due to their superior technology (protected, say, by trade secrets), or due to economies of scale. As we will see, the two types of …rms will di¤er in their abilities to sustain relational contracts.
Information structure
As in Waldman (1984) , the human capital developed by a young worker is not directly observed by the market. The actual level of a worker's human capital can only be observed by the worker's …rst period employer. At the end of a period, each employer promotes the most able worker to the managerial position, a decision that can be observed by competing …rms. Based on this observation, the market forms expectations about the productivity of the promoted worker (the winner of the promotion tournament), as well as about the productivity of the unpromoted workers. In addition to observing the …rms'promotion decisions, the market (including all workers) can observe the past wage o¤ers made by the …rms.
Wage determination
Formal contracts contingent on the level of accumulated human capital or on a worker's output are not feasible. Similarly, long-term wage contracts cannot be written, which means that an old worker's wage is constrained by the competitive wage that would prevail in the spot market at the beginning of a given period. The spot market wage is determined by simultaneous wage o¤ers made at the beginning of each period by both the initial employer and the competing …rms, who …rst observe the old workers'job assignments by their initial employers. 9 Each worker accepts the highest wage o¤er. A worker accepts an outside o¤er only if it strictly dominates the o¤er made by his …rst period employer. If there are multiple highest outside o¤ers, the worker decides among them randomly. The details of the competition among …rms for workers when the wages depend on relational contracts will be described in Section 4.
Preliminary analysis: Two benchmarks
This section contains an analysis of two benchmark settings. In the …rst one, …rms have no commitment power regarding the future wages, which means that the tournaments are completely determined by the static, spot market wages. In the second benchmark setting, the …rms can costlessly commit to arbitrary second period wages, constrained only by the workers'freedom to quit after learning the outcome of the …rst period contest and seek employment elsewhere.
Promotion tournaments with spot market wages
Let h (V ) be the equilibrium human capital investment by a worker i initially employed in a …rm with technology V . Further, let h k (V ) denote the expectation about an old worker's level of human capital that the market forms after observing the worker's job assignment at his initial employer with technology V , where k = m if the worker was promoted to the managerial position and k =ì f the worker was not promoted and remains a laborer. If the outside market believes that the …rm always promotes its best worker, then h k (V ) = h (V ) + k , where m = E( i j i best of n contestants) and `= E( i j i not best of n contestants). 10 The equilibrium concept used here is that of a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and to ensure unique wages, I use Myerson's (1978) Proper Equilibrium re…nement. Proposition 1 below characterizes 9 Some related papers have used a wage setting process in which a worker's current employer is allowed to make a …nal counter-o¤er (see, e.g., Greenwald, 1986, and Ghosh and Waldman, 2006) . In the present model, this would lead to an extreme case of adverse selection, in which the outside …rms would always o¤er the wage equal to the expected productivity of the lowest ability worker, regardless of the worker's assignment. However, as in Greenwald (1986) and Gibbons and Katz (1991) , this adverse selection could be mitigated by assuming some exogenous turnover. 1 0 The …rm is always willing to promote the worker with the highest realized level of skills because a worker's productivity does not depend on his job assignment. To ensure that the …rm strictly prefers to promote the best contestant, it would be enough to assume that instead of V h , a worker's productivity in the managerial job is
the equilibrium spot market wage W m (V ) of an old worker promoted to the managerial position in a …rm with technology V , as well as the spot market wage of an unpromoted worker, W`(V ). 11 Proposition 1. In equilibrium, the spot market tournament is characterized by the second pe-
Thus, in a one-shot game with no commitment, the tournament is beyond the control of the workers'employer. Instead, the workers compete for prizes that are fully determined by the outside labor market -the prizes are equal to the workers'expected productivities in a (competing) V H …rm, conditional on their job assignments at their …rst period employer. These wages determine the workers'incentives to accumulate human capital and the e¢ ciency of the promotion tournament.
The wages of young workers, w y , are determined by the zero pro…t condition for the V L …rms:
These wages do not a¤ect the workers'incentives to accumulate human capital and are only relevant for the analysis of the e¤ects of wage ‡oors in Section 5.
Consider now a worker i who invests h i in accumulation of human capital and, focusing on a symmetric equilibrium, let h denote the investment level of the other workers in the …rm. The probability that worker i wins the promotion is
where x = h i h. 12 Using this probability function, worker i chooses his investment level to maximize his expected payo¤
Since all workers share the same objective function, in a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium it must be
a representative worker's unconstrained …rst order condition 13 is
1 1 All proofs are in the Appendix. 1 2 The implicit assumption here is that and are …nite and x 0. If or or both were in…nite, or if x < 0;
the expression for G(x) would require a slight modi…cation. However, this has no bearing on the results that follow. 1 3 The second order conditions for rank-order tournaments are discussed in Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Nalebu¤ and Stiglitz (1983) . In general, what is needed is that the dispersion in abilities (variance of ) is su¢ ciently high, so that there is enough noise in the tournament. Otherwise, the workers'reaction functions may be discontinuous and no pure strategy equilibrium may exist.
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Each worker's equilibrium level of investment is then given by h =ĥ ifĥ h and by h = h otherwise.
Because the …rst best level of investment, h F B X , X = L; H, is determined by
and by h F B X = h otherwise, it immediately follows that when …rms cannot commit to future wages, promotion tournaments generically do not provide e¢ cient incentives. Both under-and over-investment is possible, depending upon the underlying distribution of the noise term . For example, when F ( ) is uniform, the …rst order condition (1) reduces to
:
In this case, the workers always (weakly) underinvest in accumulation of human capital, because Assumption 1(a) implies that nV H 2(n+1) < V L for all n. On the other hand, when n = 2 and F ( ) is normal with zero mean and variance 2 , the …rst order condition (1) becomes
Because the right hand side approaches in…nity as 2 ! 0 14 whereas the e¢ cient investment is independent of 2 , the workers overinvest if 2 is su¢ ciently small. 15, 16 While overinvestment is a theoretical possibility, underinvestment appears most descriptive. 17 In the interest of reducing the number of cases that need to be analyzed, I will therefore focus on the case where the investment incentives provided by the spot market tournaments are too weak in both types of …rms, that is, h < h F B L . In terms of parameter values, this requires
Under the above assumption (which for some distributions, including the uniform distribution, is implied by Assumption 1(a)), both types of …rms would like to increase the wage of the promoted 1 4 To see this, let z =2 . The right hand side can then be written as M= , where M 1 5 Related to the discussion of the second order conditions in footnote 15, note that 2 cannot be too small.
Otherwise, overinvestment would be so severe that the workers would prefer not to invest at all, in which case a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium would not exist. 1 6 The normal distribution violates Assumption 1. However, for 2 small, a truncation on a …nite interval [ ; ] can provide a reasonably good approximation and also satisfy the assumption. 1 7 For example, Rosen (1996) has argued that there are few labor markets that seem to be plagued by a wastefully …erce competition. worker above the spot market level, thus increasing the promotion premium and strengthening the incentives provided by the tournament. The analysis of the case where the spot market tournaments in both types of …rms provide incentives that are stronger than e¢ cient would be similar, except that the …rms would now want to commit to a higher-than-the-market wage for the unpromoted workers. 18 This would reduce the promotion premium and weaken the incentives provided by the tournaments, making them more e¢ cient.
Promotion tournaments under full commitment
For the second benchmark, suppose now the …rms have full commitment power, i.e., they can specify the wages of old workers in binding long-term (two-period) contracts. Clearly, even with commitment power, no …rm can a¤ord to o¤er a future wage that is lower than the spot market . There is a third case, which applies when
. In this case, the VH …rms would like to strengthen and the VL …rms would like to mute the incentives provided by their respective tournaments. These cases may require that Assumption 1(a) is relaxed.
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have an incentive to pay them more than the spot market wages. But as we have seen above, spot market tournaments are generically ine¢ cient. The …rms would therefore like to be able to commit to tournament prizes that exceed the spot market wages. Moreover, if commitment were costless, each …rm would design its tournament so as to maximize the surplus from the employment relationship, which requires that the workers invest at the …rst best level. The focus of this section will be on investigating under what conditions and to what extent this is feasible when the commitment works through repeated interaction. It will turn out that there is a fundamental di¤erence between how this commitment mechanism works in the low technology (V L ) and in the high technology (V H ) …rms.
Relational tournaments in competitive …rms
Consider a V L …rm that promises to pay its managers an amount D L above the spot market wage.
This promise can be credible only if the …rm has something to lose by breaking it, that is, in equilibrium the …rm has to make a positive pro…t. Denote a V L …rm's per period pro…t from a relational contract as R L . I will assume that if the …rm reneges on its promise and does not pay the wage premium D L to the promoted worker, the relationship between the …rm and its workers reverts to spot market contracting from that point on. 19 This yields the following incentive compatibility constraint for the V L …rms:
Constraint (IC L ) will determine the set of the Perfect Public Equilibria of the repeated game (PPE) of this game.
It is a standard result in static models of competitive labor markets that free entry of …rms forces them to maximize the workers'lifetime utilities. As is well known, however, repeated games can generate multiple perfect public equilibria. Following MacLeod and Malcomson (1988), Che and Yoo (2001), and others, I will focus on an equilibrium that is the equivalent of the static free entry equilibrium, i.e. the PPE in which the V L …rms design their contracts so as to maximize the workers'utilities. I will discuss later the role of this equilibrium selection concept.
In the equilibrium in which the V L …rms attempt to maximize the workers'utilities, condition (IC L ) must hold with equality. Unlike in the static models, however, the …rms earn pro…ts, but only enough to have su¢ cient incentives to abide with the relational contracts. Denote as h R L the equilibrium level of human capital investment in the V L …rms when wages are determined by PPE of relational contracts. The e¢ ciency of investment in these competitive …rms is described in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. There exist and from (0; 1) such that the equilibrium level of investment in the V L …rms is characterized as follows:
(i) If , then h R L = h , i.e., the tournament prizes in the V L …rms are equal to the spot market wages and the workers' human capital investment in these …rms is given by (1) .
(ii) If > , then h R L > h , i.e., the …rms o¤ er relational contracts in which the workers in the V L …rms invest more e¢ ciently than under spot market contracts.
(iii) However, h R L < h F B L for all < 1, that is, full e¢ ciency is never achieved in the V L …rms.
As one might expect based on the standard folk theorems for repeated games, relational contracts allow …rms to improve upon the e¢ ciency of corporate tournaments. However, they never lead to full e¢ ciency, which is the main result of this section. The logic behind Proposition 2 is as follows. As indicated in the discussion preceding the proposition, in any equilibrium in which a …rm pays its managers more than the spot market wage, this …rm must earn a positive expected pro…t in every period, in order to have an incentive not to renege on its wage promises. Knowing this, young workers are willing to accept a …rst-period wage that is less than their marginal product, because they realize that this will help the …rm to maintain a relational contract that improves the e¢ ciency of their human capital investment and they will capture this e¢ ciency improvement through higher second period wages.
Thus, a V L …rm is able both to credibly commit to an above-spot market managerial wage and to attract young workers only if the e¢ ciency gain from stronger investment incentives, measured
, is such that (a) the workers'lifetime expected utilities are at least as high as what they would get in a …rm who pays the spot market wages, while at the same time, (b) the present value of the …rm's future pro…ts is su¢ ciently high in every period to satisfy 13 the …rm's incentive compatibility constraint (IC L ). These two conditions can hold simultaneously only if the …rm is su¢ ciently patient, i.e., is close to one, which yields parts (i) and (ii) in the proposition.
To see what drives the result in part (iii), note that stronger incentives require a higher managerial wage, which in turn means that the …rm must receive more pro…t if its incentive compatibility constraint is to be satis…ed. This implies that the residual surplus, which accrues to the workers, increases at a lower rate than the total surplus and therefore is maximized at a lower level of investment than the …rst best level. Because labor market competition forces the …rms to o¤er the relational contracts that maximize the surplus received by the workers, the V L …rms choose this lower investment level.
In addition to the above main result, the proposition says that a higher discount rate will lead to higher wages. For example, to the extent that a …rm's …nancial situation and its ease of access to external funds can proxy for the …rm's perceived interest rate, the model predicts higher wages and more human capital investment in …nancially sound …rms and in …rms with easy access to external funds. On the other hand, …rms that face the threat of bankruptcy (and therefore heavily discount the future relationships with their workers) should pay spot market wages equal to the workers' average productivities.
Finally, it is worth noting here that the …rms with relational tournaments are consistently overpaying their managers, as they pay them wages greater than the managers'average productivity.
Contrary to the conclusions of the theories of executive compensation that stress managerial power (e.g., Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker, 2002) , this overpayment serves to improve e¢ ciency.
The current paper's focus on an equilibrium that maximizes the workers'utilities seems natural in the present setting and, as discussed above, follows both the conventional approach in static models as well as the equilibrium selection approach in previous work on relational contracts.
However, the existence of other perfect public equilibria makes it possible to better highlight the forces behind part (iii) of Proposition 2. In particular, the next proposition demonstrates that the failure to achieve full e¢ ciency in the market equilibrium is not driven by the usual reason that the combined surplus is too small to sustain a relational contract. Rather, the ine¢ ciency stems from the requirement that free entry forces the …rms to maximize the workers'lifetime utilities. Without this requirement, full e¢ ciency would always be feasible for su¢ ciently large discount factors.
Proposition 3. Suppose the …rms do not maximize the workers' utilities. Then there is a^ 2 (0; 1) such that for all >^ , there exists a PPE in which the workers in the V L …rms invest at the …rst best level, i.e., h R L = h F B L .
Relational tournaments in high technology …rms
When the workers'wages are determined by the spot labor markets, the V L …rms earn zero expected pro…t, due to free entry. On the other hand, the V H …rms'superior technology commands a rentbecause under spot market tournaments the workers in both types of …rms invest equally, each V H …rm makes a per period expected pro…t of n(V H V L ) + h n(V H V L ) > 0. This section shows that due to their greater pro…tability, the V H …rms will have both the ability and the incentive to design more e¢ cient promotion tournaments than the competitive, V L …rms.
Their pro…tability provides the V H …rms with an advantage when competing for workers with the V L …rms. Speci…cally, they do not need to design their contracts so as to maximize the workers' expected lifetime utilities; they only need to o¤er the utility the workers would get in a V L …rm. 
and subject to (IC H ). Here, (4) is the workers'…rst order condition for human capital accumulation under the relational contract in a V H …rm (same as in a V L …rm) and (5) is the workers'individual rationality constraint.
Let h R H be the level of human capital investment corresponding to the relational promotion tournament that solves the above program. This investment level is characterized as follows.
Proposition 4.
(i) In the high technology ( V H ) …rms, relational contracts are feasible for a strictly greater set of discount factors than in the competitive ( V L ) …rms.
That is, the high technology …rms provide stronger investment incentives than competitive …rms. They provide strictly stronger incentives whenever the competitive …rms are able to sustain a relational contract that improves upon spot market contracting.
That is, if they are su¢ ciently patient, the high technology …rms o¤ er relational contracts in which the workers' investment incentives are fully e¢ cient.
Thus, technological e¢ ciency breeds incentive e¢ ciency: Proposition 4 says that pro…table …rms have both the ability and the motivation to provide at least weakly stronger incentives for human capital accumulation than competitive …rms. The greater ability of the V H …rms to provide stronger incentives stems from their greater productivity, which implies that any given increase in the workers'investments generates more surplus in a V H …rm than in a V L …rm. Since the amount of surplus is critical for a …rm's ability to sustain a relational contract, the V H …rms are able to implement relational contracts for a greater set of parameter values.
To see why the V H …rms have an incentive to design more e¢ cient tournaments than the competitive …rms, recall that the reason why the V L …rms never o¤er fully e¢ cient tournaments, no matter how patient they are, is that these …rms need to share the additional surplus with their workers, balancing the desire to attract the workers with the need to make sure that the relational contract is incentive compatible. The V H …rms do not face the former constraint: being more productive, they can always outbid the V L …rms in the labor market and they get to keep any additional surplus they create by improving the e¢ ciency of their tournaments. Therefore, they behave as residual claimants when designing their relational contracts and their sole binding constraint is their incentive compatibility constraint which determines which relational contracts are feasible. Thus, a V H …rm always has an incentive to o¤er the most e¢ cient contract that can be sustained. When the interest rate is low, fully e¢ cient tournaments become feasible and, unlike the competitive …rms, the V H …rms adopt them.
The main empirical implication of the above results is that both wages and investment in human capital should be related to a …rm's pro…tability/market power and to its perceived interest rate.
In particular, in normal labor markets (i.e., in markets in which the winner-take-all aspect of the As mentioned in the Introduction, the results of Propositions 2 and 4 also contribute to the literature on the relationship between product market competition and the e¢ ciency of incentives within …rms. The past debate on the topic has focused mainly on the e¤ects of product market competition on the incentives of the …rms'top managers and tended to favor the conclusion that product market competition leads to better managerial incentives. 20 In the present framework, product market competition a¤ects the incentives of junior employees rather than those of the top managers; moreover, the e¤ect of product market competition on incentives is unambiguously negative.
2 0 More competitive markets provide better information about the managers' actions, which allows the …rms to provide more e¢ cient incentives (Hart, 1983) . A more …erce competition also means that a …rm with an underperforming manager is more likely to go bankrupt, which again strengthens the manager's incentives (Schmidt, 1997) .
On the other hand, a …rm's pro…ts are smaller in a more competitive industry, which can decrease the marginal value of the manager's e¤ort and hence weaken his incentives (Schmidt, 1997; Raith, 2003) . 
The e¤ects of minimum wages

The e¤ects of a wage ‡oor on competitive …rms
Consider …rst the V L …rms in the static setting with full commitment. By imposing a lower bound on the wages of young workers, a wage ‡oor hampers the …rms'ability to recoup in the …rst period their second period losses due to managerial wages that exceed the spot market wage. When the wage of young workers is w, a V L …rm's expected pro…t from a given worker is
where, as before, h D h(D) is given by the …rst order condition (2) and represents the investment level in a V L …rm when the managerial wage is W m + D and when the wage of a laborer is W`.
Labor market competition forces the V L …rms to choose the wage premium D that maximizes the workers'expected lifetime utilities
subject to the break-even condition L (D; w) 0 and subject to the wage ‡oor constraint w w.
Assuming that both L (D; w) and u(D; w) are quasi-concave in D, the solution to this problem is characterized by the following proposition.
Proposition 5. Suppose …rms can commit to future wages. Then a wage ‡oor constrains the equilibrium investment in the V L …rms, h L ( w), to be lower than the …rst best level h F B L . Moreover, h L ( w) strictly decreases in w.
Thus, despite full commitment, a wage ‡oor makes the …rst best level of investment infeasible in the V L …rms. This further curbs the workers'incentives and distorts their human capital investments away from the e¢ cient level. The above result assumes full commitment, but it should be clear from the analysis in the previous section that when commitment comes from repeated interaction, the …rms'incentives to design e¢ cient tournaments are even weaker than under full commitment.
Note that the decreased level of human capital accumulation decreases the productivity of both laborers and managers and therefore leads to lower wages, as well as to a smaller di¤erence between managerial wages and the wages of laborers. This is consistent with the observation that the di¤erences between managerial wages and the wages of lower level workers tend to be smaller, while minimum wages tend to be higher, in the countries of continental Europe than in the United Sates.
The e¤ects of a wage ‡oor on high technology …rms
The next two results show that in the V H …rms, a wage ‡oor can either suppress or encourage human capital investment. Proposition 6 demonstrates that a wage ‡oor can suppress human capital investment also in the high technology …rms -in fact, it can eliminate any di¤erence that would be observed in the absence of the constraint between the investments in the V L and in the V H …rms. The logic behind this result is as follows: As demonstrated by Proposition 5, even under perfect commitment, a wage ‡oor prevents the V L …rms from providing fully e¢ cient tournaments, because it constrains their ability to recoup through lower …rst period wages the second period losses due to an above market prize for the tournament winner. This means that in equilibrium, a V L …rm's pro…t must be strictly decreasing in the managerial wage, because otherwise the …rm would have an incentive to improve e¢ ciency by increasing the managerial wage. But if an increase in the managerial wage would strictly lower the pro…t of a V L …rm, this must also be true for a V H …rm if V H is only slightly higher than V L . Consequently, when V H is close to V L , the V H …rms have no incentive to o¤er stronger tournaments than the V L …rms. As before, because this result was obtained under the assumption of full commitment, repeated interaction would not help here. H . This is also true when commitment comes from repeated interaction, as long as is su¢ ciently large.
The above result shows that, contrary to the received wisdom, a minimum wage can encourage human capital accumulation, as long as the …rms are not perfectly competitive. This, however, does not necessarily mean that wage ‡oors improve welfare, because the resulting human capital investment could be ine¢ ciently high.
The intuition behind Proposition 7 is that when the workers' human capital investment is su¢ ciently responsive to more powerful tournaments (i.e., C is relatively small), an increase in the managerial wage above the …rst best level induces a relatively large increase in the workers' productivities. In the absence of a wage ‡oor, the …rms would not want to induce investment in excess of the …rst best level, because they would ultimately bear the cost of this investment through the workers'binding participation constraints. However, a wage ‡oor makes it impossible for the V H …rms to always hold their workers down to their reservation utilities. Consequently, the …rms do not internalize all of the investment costs -they can induce more investment without compensating the workers for the additional investment costs and they …nd it optimal to do so when a small increase in the managerial wage induces a large increase in the workers'investments.
Conclusion
Internal promotions to scarce managerial positions are a salient feature of hierarchical organizations. This paper has argued that the standard theory of promotion tournaments, in which a …rm is assumed to have unlimited commitment power when designing the tournament prizes, has important limitations. Firms compete for their employees with other …rms and therefore cannot promise arbitrary wages -not only do the wages have to induce ex ante participation, as in the standard models, but also ex post participation, because unpromoted workers could simply quit rather than toil on under the low wages o¤ered to the tournament losers. This in turn constrains the wages that the …rms can o¤er to the tournament winners.
Some of the …rms'ability to control the tournament prizes is regained when …rms are long lived and build a reputation for paying wages that are greater than the spot market wage. This ability, however, depends critically on the market structure in which the …rms operate. While pro…table (monopolistic) …rms design fully e¢ cient tournaments when they are su¢ ciently patient, competitive …rms never achieve full e¢ ciency. Thus, in the present framework, technological e¢ ciency breeds incentive e¢ ciency. Similarly, competitive and monopolistic …rms di¤er in how the human capital investment induced by their tournaments depends on minimum wage regulations and other wage ‡oors. While a wage ‡oor always suppresses human capital investment in competitive …rms, it could lead to excessive human capital accumulation in monopolistic …rms.
More generally, the fundamental di¤erence between the view of promotion tournaments here and in the standard theory is that in the present paper promotions provide incentives "accidentally." Promoted workers are perceived by the labor market to be of higher productivity than unpromoted workers and therefore command higher wages. Thus, whether …rms intend it or not, promotions are valued by the workers and motivate them to improve their productivity. The …rms may try and shape the tournaments away from the labor market default, but this may not always be possible.
At least to some extent, the tournament and the resulting investment in human capital will always bear the imprint of the …rm's technology and of the market conditions in which the …rm operates, such as the degree of product and labor market competition, market interest rates, the …rm's access to credit, and so on. This could be exploited in empirical tests and it also suggests an interesting direction for future research: As pointed out by Gibbs (1995) , if …rms cannot rely on promotions to always provide e¢ cient incentives, they may need to complement them by additional performance contracts (as many …rms do). This establishes a link between market conditions and formal incentive contracts that has not been su¢ ciently explored in the existing literature.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: The proof follows similar logic as the proof of Proposition 1 in Zabojnik and Bernhardt (2001) . Consider a …rm with technology V and suppose that the outside …rms expect this …rms' workers to choose an investment level h(V ). If a worker stays with his initial employer, his productivity is at least V (h(V ) + ). If the worker changes employers, then his expected productivity is at most equal to V H (h(V ) + m ), which is less than V (h(V ) + ), by Assumption 1(a). The worker's …rst period employer can therefore always outbid any outside …rm, which means that all the workers remain with their …rst period employers. Now consider the wage bids. A promoted worker's expected productivity in an outside …rm with
if it expects the incumbent …rm to also bid this amount. For the incumbent …rm, in turn, it is the best response to bid V H (h(V ) + m ) if it expects all outside V H …rms to bid this much, because this is the minimum bid that allows it to retain the worker (and earn positive pro…t from him).
The same argument applies to the wage bids for an unpromoted worker. Therefore, the wage o¤ers that are equal to the workers'expected productivities in V H …rms, i.e., W m (V ) = V H h m (V ) and
To see that this equilibrium is the unique proper equilibrium, notice …rst that it cannot be that
Otherwise, an outside V H …rm would …nd it pro…table to deviate and o¤er a slightly higher wage, which would allow this …rm to attract the worker and make positive pro…t. Now suppose that both the incumbent and the outside V H …rms play totally mixed strategy pro…les when bidding for the promoted worker. Then with a positive probability, each outside …rm outbids all the other …rms (including the incumbent) and hires the promoted worker at a wage strictly greater than the worker's expected productivity V H h m (V ). Thus, each outside …rm has an incentive to deviate to a strategy that places zero probability on wages greater than V H h m (V ). This means that no wage greater than V H h m (V ) can be a proper equilibrium, i.e. a limit point of a sequence of equilibria in totally mixed strategies. The argument for the wage of an unpromoted worker follows the same steps. 23 1). The investment level h D is thus given by the …rst order condition
Note that h D = h when D = 0 and that @h D @D > 0.
Now, let^ L ^ L ( ; D) be the minimum per period pro…t such that the …rm's incentive compatibility condition (IC L ) is satis…ed for a given D, i.e.,
and letŵ L ^ L ( ; D) be the young workers' wage that in expectation allows the …rm to earn L per period if it does not deviate from the promised wages, i.e.,ŵ L = V L D n ^ L n . Next, denote by S L S L ( ; D) the expected increase in surplus per worker that is due to the stronger investment incentives induced by the higher managerial wage:
The amount^ L =n of this e¢ ciency increase must go to the …rm in order to satisfy its incentive compatibility condition (IC L ). The wage W m + D can then be sustained as part of an equilibrium if and only if S L ^ L =n 0:
As will be shown below, if the above condition is satis…ed, one can construct perfect public equilibrium strategies that support the wage W m + D, while if the condition does not hold, the workers prefer working for the …rms that pay the spot market wages W m and W`(due to free entry, such …rms are readily available). After substituting for^ L from (IC 0 L ), the above condition becomes
Now, lim !0 h D = lim !0 h = 0, so that as ! 0, the left hand side of (3) approaches 1
for any D > 0. Consequently, there must exist a > 0 such that (3) cannot hold when .
For these parameter values, there cannot exist a relational contract in which a V L …rm pays other than the spot market wages. This proves part (i) of the proposition.
(ii) and (iii). Let go to 1. 
which is transferred to the workers in the form of higher managerial wages. The …rst order condition for this maximization problem yields
Let D R L denote the managerial wage increase that induces the workers to invest h R L in accumulation of human capital. To complete the proof of parts (ii) and (iii), it remains to specify the …rm's and the workers'strategies that sustain D R L and h R L as part of a perfect public equilibrium when . Consider the following strategies:
Firm: O¤er the wage W`to unpromoted old workers, W m + D R L to the promoted worker, and w L < V to young workers, whereŵ L is as constructed above. Continue to pay these wages as long as they were also paid in all previous periods. If in some period t the …rm deviates by o¤ering a …rst period wage w 6 =ŵ L or by paying its tournament winner other than W m + D R L , switch from period t + 1 on to o¤ering w L = V L to young workers and W`and W m to old workers.
Workers: Accept no …rst period wage w < V , unless it is equal toŵ L . If some worker in a period t deviates, switch from period t + 1 on to not accepting any wage lower than V . Invest h R L as given by (2) .
I will now show that the above strategies constitute a perfect public equilibrium of the repeated game, that is, given that other players stick to their strategies, no player has an incentive to deviate for one period and then return back to the original strategy.
Firms: If the …rm follows the equilibrium strategy, it gets expected pro…t equal to^ L 1 > 0: If the …rm deviates by o¤ering a higher …rst period wage, it gets an expected pro…t lower than^ L <^ L 1 this period and zero in all subsequent periods. Similarly, cheating the tournament winner is not pro…table by construction of the wageŵ L and of the pro…t^ L : If a …rm deviates in the punishment phase by o¤ering a …rst period wage less than V , it does not attract any workers, so its pro…t is zero as when it does not deviate. If it o¤ers more than V , it earns a negative expected pro…t.
Thus, the …rm has no incentive to deviate from the proposed strategy.
Workers: Suppose that in period t, a young worker accepts a …rst period wage w 0 6 =ŵ L such that w 0 < V . Given that the …rm follows its equilibrium strategy and switches to o¤ering spot market wages from period t + 1 on, this worker's expected lifetime utility is Proof of Proposition 4: (i) Analogous to the case of a V L …rm, the surplus per worker, S H , created in a V H …rm through a relational contract that increases the managerial wage by an amount D above its spot market level, is given by
Again, a relational contract is feasible only if S H (D) is su¢ ciently large so that (a) the V H …rm's incentive compatibility constraint (IC H ) holds and (b) the …rm can attract workers. Let^ R H be the minimum pro…t the …rm must earn in every period in order to satisfy (IC H ) and let 4U R L denote the extra expected lifetime utility (compared to the spot market) that the workers receive under the relational contracts in the V L …rms. A relational contract in a V H …rm is then feasible if
Recall from the proof of Proposition 3 that D R L denotes the equilibrium increase in the managerial wage in the V L …rms such that the workers'utility maximizing investment level is h R L . Also from the proof of Proposition 3, 
Now, for any D > 0, V H > V L implies
Consequently, for any given , (7) holds when D = D R L . That is, any relational contract that is feasible and o¤ered in equilibrium by the V L …rms is also feasible in the V H …rms. Moreover, if
which is a strictly weaker condition than (3). Therefore, it must be that in the V H …rms relational contracts are feasible for a strictly greater set of discount factors than in the V L …rms, which concludes the proof of part (i).
(ii) Suppose now that is such that a relational contract is feasible in the V H …rms. Pro…t maximization implies that the workers' participation constraint (5) holds with equality. Substituting this constraint to the …rm's objective function, the …rm's maximization problem becomes
subject to (4) and (7) .
Di¤erentiating the objective function with respect to D yields
Because @h D @D > 0, it follows that @(M AX) 
H , and therefore also increases in D for all D < D F B . Consequently, (9) holds for all D 2 [D R L ; D F B H ]. Hence, by continuity of (7) in , there must exist a F B < 1 such that (7) holds at D = D F B H (so that h R H = h F B H ) for all F B .
Proof of Proposition 5: First, notice that the constraint L (D; w) 0 must bind in equilibrium.
Otherwise, new V L …rms could enter the market and attract young workers away from the existing V L …rms by o¤ering a slightly higher wage. Similarly, the constraint w w must bind. Otherwise, we would be back in the unconstrained full commitment setting. As argued in subsection 3.2, the workers invest at the the …rst best level in such a setting. But the …rst best outcome is not
is the managerial wage premium that elicits the …rst best level of investment in the V L …rms.
The above arguments imply that the equilibrium level of investment is given by the wage premium D L ( w) that is implicitly de…ned by L (D L ( w); w) = 0:
Because, by assumption, w does not bind under the spot market tournament (when D L = 0 and L = 0), (10) has at least one solution.
Suppose that D L ( w) D F B L . Then it must be u L (D L ( w); w) u L (D F B L ; w);
because only the …rms that maximize the workers'lifetime utilities can attract young workers. Now, writing L (D; w) = V L + h D V L c(h D ) u L (D; w) and using (11) , the V L …rms'equilibrium pro…ts are constrained by
But the right hand side of (12) is maximized at h F B L , i.e., it must be that L (D L ( w); w) L (D F B L ; w) < 0, where the strict inequality follows from L (D F B L ; w F B L ) = 0 and from w F B L < w. This proves that it cannot be that D L ( w) D F B L .
28
To see that h L ( w) decreases in w, di¤erentiate (10) implicitly with respect to w to get @h L @ w @ L (D; w) @D j D=D L ( w) = 1:
Hence, has to be negative). The second inequality implies that the V H …rms will choose the maximum feasible D, i.e., they will choose D = D max , where D max max D fD : u(D; w) u L (D L ( w); w)g.
Because @u(D; w) @D j D=D L ( w) > 0 (from the proof of Proposition 5), it must be that D max > D L ( w). Moreover, because c(:) is quadratic and convex, it must be that lim h!1 c 0 (h) = 1 and, from 
where h D max is the level of investment induced by the managerial wage premium D max . Now, the …rst best level of investment in the V H …rms is given by V H = c 0 (h F B H ), whereas the left hand side of (13) is maximized atD given by V H + C g(0)n = c 0 (hD). Let C = C 2 , so that ( 1)V H g(0) C 2 = 1 n : This implies V H = V H + C 2 g(0)n , which means that hD = h F B H for C = C 2 . Therefore, D max >D for C = C 2 , and becauseD = D F B H for this parameter value, it must be h H ( w) > h F B H when C = C 2 . Continuity of u(D; w) in C then implies that there exists a C + 2 (C 1 ; C 2 ) such that D max >D (and hence h H ( w) > h F B H ) for all C 2 (C + ; C 2 ). Setting C C + and C C 2 concludes the proof of the …rst claim in the proposition. Now suppose that commitment comes from repeated interaction. Then the only change in the V H …rms'optimization problem compared to the …rst part of the proof is that the D they choose has to satisfy their incentive compatibility constraint. This constraint is similar to (IC H ) in the analysis without minimum wages, except that the pro…t per period, R H , is obtained using the minimum wage w for young workers: R H = V H w + ( 1)V H h D D=n. Thus, the …rm again chooses D max , as long as
Now, the arguments in the …rst part of the proof hold for any , including = 1. Thus, let ! 1.
Then the right hand side of (IC 0 H ) approaches in…nity, because R H (D max ) > S H (otherwise, the …rm would prefer D = 0 to D = D max ). Because D max is …nite (as shown in the …rst part of the proof), (IC 0 H ) must hold for su¢ ciently close to 1.
